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Whyarewages 32% higher in cities than outside metropolitan areas? Higher
costs of living and the inconveniences of cities may explain why labor does not
immediately flock to those higher wages, but why do firms stay where the price
of labor is so high? If labor markets are perfectly competitive, thiswage
difference implies that the marginal product of labor is 30% greater in cities than
in the hinterland.
This essay examines three possible interpretations of this fact: (1) the urbanwage
premium is illusory and represents omitted ability variables, (2) the urban wage
premium comes from a level effect where cities (either because of reduced
transportation costs or because of urban externalities) enhance worker
productivity and (3) the urban wage premium is the result of greater wage
growth in cities (a growth not a level effect). We use a combination of panel data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (hereafter PSID) and the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (hereafter NLSY) to test between these alternative
hypotheses. We use a series of ordinary wage regressions, fixed effects
estimation, instrumental variables techniques and data on migrants to
distinguish between these explanations of the urban wage premium.
Wages are 32% higher in large cities (of over .5 million inhabitants) than in the
hinterland. Wages are 21% higher in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas
outside large cities (hereafter non-city SMSAs) than in the hinterland. Thiswage
gap falls by less than 4% when we control for education, experience and race.
This wage gap falls only 2% more when we control for tenure and occupation.
The urban wage premium is significantly higher for older workers, but the gains
from living in a city are not higher for the more educated or those with more
tenure.
The urban premium, however, faUs to 3% when we control for individual fixed
effects. We use the longitudinal nature of the PSID to control for an
idiosyncratic, time invariant, individual productivity effect, and the urban wage
premium disappears on average. There is, however, still an urban wage
2premium for older workers even when fixed effects are included in the
regression.
The fixed effects methodology gets identification from movers. We examined
these migrants who give us the fixed effects estimates in more detail to better
understand those estimates. After they move migrants (both rural-urban and
urban-rural) experience wage growth of around 10%. Since wages rise moving
in either direction (which is necessary to compensate for the costs ofmobility),
the fixed effects do not show a wage premium. Even interpreting these results
as an urban premium of 10% that works in a direct level effect received
immediately by new migrants, this effect explains at best one-third of the urban
wage premium. We believe that the faster wage growth that some migrants
seem to receive over time points to the correct explanation that the bulk of the
urban wage premium accrues over time to workers.
To further investigate, we use the NLSY to construct instrumentalvariables
estimators of the SMSA wage premium. Using the place of residence atage 14 as
an instrument for current urban residence, we find that the urbanwage premium
rises. When we include other instruments (meant tocapture other, non-ability
related, reasons for living in the city) we find that the instrumental variables
estimates of the urban wage premium rise even more.
The instrumental variables results, the fixed effects results for olderworkers, and
the extra wage growth received by migrants in cities allsuggest that the urban
wage premium is not all omitted ability bias. However, the results showing a
low immediate migration effect and no fixed effects urbanwage premium seem
to go against the view of the urban wage premium as a fixed level effect.The one
hypothesis readily compatible with all of these facts is the view of citiesas
generators of human capital growth. This view also explains why the interaction
between experience and urban residence is found to bepositive in the straight
wage regressions --olderworkers have lived longer (on average) in the city and
have experienced longer periods of highwage growth.
To further understand the wage growth effect we distinguished betweentwo
versions: (1) the learning hypothesis where cities enhancedgeneral skill
acquisition and (2) the coordination hypothesis where urban labor markets
3allowed better matching between workers and jobs. We tested between these
hypotheses by including a series of characteristics meant to take account of
match quality (occupational information and tenure). After including these
variables the interaction between experience and urban resident did not
disappear. So we believe that the urban wage growth effect is not simply a result
of better labor market coordination in cities. Workers are actually acquiring
more skills in dense environments.
The next section discusses the theories of the paper. Section ifi presents the data.
Section IV presents the results. Section V concludes.
II. Discussion
This section presents a setting for the empirical work. We wish to put forward a
series of explanations for the differences between urban wages and non-urban
wages and some testable implications of these ideas.
Labor Supply and Costs of Living
The traditional approach to wage differences across space builds on the worker's
indifference curve (e.g. Rees and Schultz (1970)), Roback (1982)). To clarify the
issues in this paper we will assume a particular utility function and demonstrate
the workings of the traditional spatial utility model. Individuals maximize a
utility function which is Cobb-Douglas in traded and non-traded goods. The
price of traded goods is normalized to 1 across locations. The price of non-traded
goods is a function of location specific characteristics (denoted Z's) and the price
will be written P(Z). Individual wages in each community will similarly be
written W(Z). With these assumptions, individuals in a location choose their
consumption of goods to maximize:
(1) X1X21-asubjectto W(Z) ￿X1 + P(Z)X2,
where X1 is the individuaUs consumption of traded goods and X2 is the
individual's consumption of traded goods. Solving this problem, the individuals'
indirect utility in a location with characteristics Z is:
4(2) A1W(Z)P(Z)a-1
where A1=aa(1a)1-z is a constant across locations. Therefore, when migration is
free and utilities are maximized across locations it must be true for two locations
with attributes Z and Z' that:
(3) Log(W(Z') /W(Z))=(1- a)Log(P(Z')/P(Z)).
The difference in the wages precisely compensates individuals for the differences
in the cost of the non-traded goods. Rauch (1991) presents the most complete
work on this equation. In his paper, Z is local human capital, and the non-traded
good is land.
Labor Demand Across Space
There is a labor demand side as well as a labor supply side to this problem.
Local area suppliers are assumed to maximize:
(4) G(Z)F(K, H(Z) L) -W(Z)L-R(Z)K,
where K is capital and L is labor. G(Z) represents any location specific affects
that change total output and can range from reduced transport costs to human
capital spilovers that raise total output. H(Z)is a location specific effect that acts
to increase the productivity of labor. R(Z) is the location specific rental price of
capital. We assume that F(K, H(Z)L) displays constant returns to scale. Using
the notation K/LH(Z)=ic,andF(K/H(Z)L, 1)=f(ic) we can rewrite (4):
(4') H(Z)L(G(Z)f(ic) -W(Z)/H(Z)-R(Z)K)
We allow for free entry in this industry so total profits (i.e. (4')) must equalzero,
so:
(5) W(Z)= G(Z)H(Z)f(i) -R(Z)H(Z)K.
Whenfirms choose capital optimally, it must be true that:
5(6) G(Z)f(K) =R(Z),or combining (5) and (6):
(7) W(Z)=G(Z)H(Z)f(f-l (R(Z) /G(Z))) -R(Z)H(Z)f-1(R(Z)/G(Z)).
This equation is the analogy for the firm of equation (3). In the case where
F(K, L) is Cobb-Douglas, i.e. F(K, H(Z)L)= Ka(H(Z)L)l-a, (7) can be reduced to:
(7') W(Z)=A2H(Z)R(Z)a/(a— ')G(Z) 11(1—c)
whereA2=(1_a)aal(l—a), a constant across locations. With two locations with
attributes Z' and Z this equation tells us that:
(8) Log(W(Z') /W(Z))=Log(H(Z')/H(Z)) +1/(1-a)Log(G(Z')IG(Z))
-a/(1-a)Log(R(Z')/R(Z)).
This equation means that a difference in wages across locations must reflect
differences in (1) the productivity of human capital (H(Z')/H(Z)) which
translates one-to-one into higher wages, (2) overall productivity ((G(Z')IG(Z)
whichcould mean lower transport costs or better access to suppliers or other
location specific productivity effects) or (3) lower costs of capital (due to better
monitoring or easier production of capital in some locations).
This paper will focus on wages as indicators9f location specific productivity or
human capital effects. We will not look at the labor supply side of the equation,
but we accept on faith that there must be cost of living differences to equalize
workers' utility across locations. The following sections look specifically at
potential factors which might make G(Z) or H(Z) higher in urban areas (and thus
explain the labor demand side of the urban wage premium).
Cities and Productivity: Neoclassical Explanations
The most standard explanations for differences between urban and non-urban
productivity focus on the transport gains to being in the city. Cities are
themselves large markets so transport costs to those markets are saved by firms
in those cities (see Krugman (1991)). Cities may also have better access to
national transportation networks. One version of the Krugman framework
6(Krugman and Livas (1993)) has a clear tradeoff between high urban wages
(created by savings in transport) offset by high urban rents (created by the
density in the urban areas).
One simple way to incorporate this effect into the above model requires
interpreting G(Z) as a transport cost parameter, which represents a percent of
product lost in transport when production occurs outside the city (i.e. iceberg
transport costs). In that case, G(Z)=G<1 outside the city and G(Z)=1 in the city.
When land is limited, then the cost of land can rise in the city so that the higher
wages are offset by higher prices. This transport cost driven effect makes the
above framework a fully specified model where cities have lower transport costs,
higher wages and higher costs of land.
Other neoclassical explanations also exist for urbanwage premia. Inputs might
also be more accessible and cheaper (again primarily because of lowertransport
costs). The cost of capital might be lower in cities since capital is easier to build
in cities or because borrowers in cities are easier to monitor. Cities might include
access to public goods in cities or private goods that have increasing returns to
scale. In general neoclassical explanations for higher urbanwages ultimately
tend to rely on the lower cost of moving inputs or outputs in big cities and imply
that higher wages should be realized by all workers immediately on arrival in
cities.
Cities and Productivity: Human Capital Externality Explanations
Externality arguments have been the centerpiece of some of the most important
works in the new urban economics. Lucas (1988) and Rauch (1991) bothargue
that the mass of human capital within cities acts to increaseaverage productivity.
Ciccone and Hail (1993) is another important paper in this area. Following much
of the modern growth literature, these papers suggest that knowledgespillovers
allow us to take advantage of our neighbors' wisdom. Since cities' density make
neighbors closer, urban areas facilitate taking advantage of local human capital.
Rauch offers evidence showing that the wages of a single worker (controlling for
that worker's human capital) are increasing in theaverage education of that
worker's location.
7These externalities may affect different individuals in differentways. The more
educated workers may benefit more from urban areas because the more educated
are better able to learn from others or the less educated may learn more because
they have a lower stock of their own human capital. Overall these explanations
simply suggest that wages should be higher in cities art d in particular in well
educated cities (as Rauch shows). In particular, externality arguments that are
based on access to better technology in cities imply that cities will movewages as
a level effect. If higher human capital levels in cities act to make production
more efficient, that too should act as a straightforward level effect. We will
distinguish these two forms of urban externalities with other forms that suggest
that cities will not affect productivity of new workers immediately. In the
alternative urban externalities ideas, only over time will workers experience
wage growth.
Cities and Productivity: Omitted Ability Bias
A third possible explanation for the urban wage premium is that workers in
cities are simply better in some unobserved way. In a pure omitted ability bias
story these better workers are attracted to the city by non-work related
advantages to being in the city or simply by luck. Non-work related advantages
might include (1) ability of social relations (especially marriage) with a wider
range of other high ability people or (2) the presence of commodities which are
particularly desired by high ability workers. Johnson (1953) particularly argued
that the differences between urban and non-urban wages is related to intrinsic
ability differences. The implication of this theory is that individuals who move
to the city will not experience wage gains and individuals who live in the city for
non-ability related reasons (i.e. because of exogenous factors determining urban
location but unrelated to ability) will not have an urban wage premium. This
theory predicts also that instrumental variables estimates of the urban wage
premium will show no urban wage premium when the instruments used are
uncorrelated with omitted individual ability. The ability bias explanations also
suggest that there should be sorting into cities based on observable
characteristics.
A' related explanation of the urban wage premium is a mixture between ability
bias and urban externalities. If cities are particularly attractive places for the
8more able to work then more able people will be attracted to cities. Then the
urban wage premium will reflect both (1) that cities make more able people more
productive and (2) cities attract more able people. This mixture requires that (1)
some urban wage premium remains when correcting for ability bias and (2) that
the urban wage premium is higher for more able workers.
Cities and Productivity: The Learning Hypothesis
Another possible explanation of the urban wage premium is the idea that urban
workers have higher levels of unmeasured human capital not because cities
attract the more able, but rather because cities enhance the accumulation of
human capital. This type of effect is not well explored in the literature although
both Marshall (1890) and Chinitz (1961) suggested that inside cities skills were
'in the air." Urban density can increase skill accumulation by speeding the rate
of new experiences or the range of experiences that individuals acquire. This
faster rate of experience should speed the accumulation of human capital.
Workers learning by observing successes and particularly failures more
frequently. Cities also might raise skill accumulation by their connection to
pools of national (or international) human capital. Cities might also allow formal
institutions of learning to cover fixed costs of production and this high number of
formal schools could also help human capital grow.
Recent papers suggesting that cities might increase the speed at which skills were
accumulated indude particularly Becker and Murphy (1993). Thispaper points
out that cities facilitate coordination, therefore individuals can specialize in a
narrower range of activities and become proficient in those activities more
quickly. Their paper does not say that cities speed human capital accumulation,
but rather since the amount of human capital for a fixed level of efficiency is
lower in more specialized professions, within cities it will seem as if individuals
have more human capital.
A similar hypothesis is that cities act as coordinators. Because of the size and
speed of urban labor pools it is simpler for workers to connect with the right
firm. Workers will be able to match more precisely to other workers since the
available pool is larger. The coordination hypothesis predicts that the urban
wage premium will mainly work through better labor market outcomes and than
9much of the urban wage premium will disappear once variables thatmeasure the
quality of the worker's match (like tenure) are included in the regression.
The implications of both the learning and the coordination theoriesare that (1)
the urban wage premium is higher for older workers who have lived in cities
longer and (2) new migrants to cities will not see wage gains immediately, but
rather over time. These theory predicts that simple fixed effects models(i.e.
where identification of the urbanwage premium looks at the wage gains
experienced by individuals who move from city to hinterland) may not pickup
any urban wage premium since the movers from hinterland to city will not
experience immediate wage growth. Instead only empirical work that tracks
rural-urban migrants over time will pickup the urban wage premium.
Instrumental variables approaches will not eliminate the urbanwage premium
since it is a real effect, not simply omitted variables bias.
A Formalization of the Learning Hypothesis
We, here, formalize some of the ideas described above in an extremelysimple
extension to the above framework. Migration decisions arepermanent and
assumed to be made at the beginning of lIfe. We also assume that individual's
human capital can be either high or low and everyone's humancapital begins as
low. Moving from low skilled to high skilled involvesmeeting someone who is
high skilled and then with probability C copying the high skills from thatperson.
I assume that each person has N meetingsper period and that only a fraction 6 of
the population (chosen randomly among the high and low skilled) survives until
next period.
We will denote ; as the proportion of the population withhigh skills in
equilibrium an at time t. The evolution of itisdetermined by 1-6 which is the
fraction of skilled workers which die each period and- 1.(1CitjN which is the
fraction of unskilled workers which become skilled.Multiplying 1-i (the
original number over unskilled) times 1(1C;)N (the share of those that become
skilled) times 6 (the share of those who survive) gives us the flow into the
population of skilled workers, or algebraically:
(9) t11=;- (1-8);+8 (1;)(1(1C,tJN) =
10Equilibria of this system occur when Jtt+i=itt. Oneequality occurs when ir+1=;
= 0.Other equilibria will be fixed points of f(.).
While we do not have closed form solutions for many values of N, it is possible
(1) to give conditions under which another equilibrium exists (other than it= 0),
(2) to show that the other equilibrium will be stable and (3) to give the
comparative statics of itwithrespect to N, the frequency of meetings. For this
analysis we know that:
(10) (1C;)N +öCN(1-it) (1C;)N.'1 =ft(it)
Equilibria will be fixed points of f(.). When 6+8CN>1, f(O)>1 and there exists in
c>0 such that 6 6(1)(1Cc)N >e, so the function f(ir) is a continuous mapping
from [c, 1] into itself, and by Brouwer's theorem this function must have a fixed
point. Furthermore since f(it) is strictly concave this fixed point must be unique
and we will denote this fixed point, its.Aslong as ait+1Ia;isgreater than one at
ic=0 (which is necessary for a second equilibrium ittoexist), then the it=0
equilibrium is unstable by standard arguments. On the other hand at it=ic",
= f'(it*)=6(1Cit*)N +6CN(1_it*)(1_Clt*)N4<1, so that equilibrium is
stable (since f(it) strikes the 45% degree line at n from above).
For our purposes the interesting comparative static is the relationship between ir
andN. We interpret N, the frequency of meeting, as a parameter capturing
density. The distinguishing feature of cities in this model is that individuals
meet other individuals at a rapid rate. Differentiating we find that:
(11) it"(N)= -Log(6(1,r*)(1-Cic)) 6(17t*) (1Cit*)N /
(1-8 (1Cit*)N +6CN(1-,t') (1Cit*)N1) >0,
so the average number of skilled individuals rise in more dense areas. This
greater number of skilled individuals tells us that the overall earnings in cities
will be higher and the relationship between experience and earnings will be
higher in urban areas.
11Figure 1 shows the model in operation. The graph maps tintoitself. Line C
shows (1-8)it. Curve B gives & (1it)(1(1C,t)N) for N=1, C=.5 and 6 =9. Curve A
use the same parameters except N=2. The higher N represents the faster rate of
meetings in the city. In Curve A the stable equilibrium shows a higher it,which
means a higher proportion of skilled workers. Figure 2 shows the wage growth
predicted by the equilibria in Figure 1. The city wages rise more quickly initially,
but eventually all workers become skilled and thewages for the oldest workers
are the same. The next model formalized a coordination based explanation of the
urban wage premium.
A Formalization of the Coordination Hypothesis
This section formalizes the idea that urban labor markets act to better match
workers and jobs. This paper represents a fairly straightforward simplification of
standard search models (see Mortenson (1986). We will simply look at the
matching of workers here, but the model is unchanged ii the interpretation
because the matching of firms and workers. We will index workers with a
variable i which ranges from negative one to one. This index does not effect
productivity directly, but workers are more productive when they are matched
to other workers who are closer to them in the index. To be precise workers
make a once and for all match to another worker and from thenon, total
discounted lifetime income per worker for workers with indices i and j is:
(12)W+A1-A2 I i-jI.
The discount rate is assumed to be ,andthe interest rate is r which is
determined so 1/(1+r) =3.The wage is the flow value of the stock of earnings or
rW+A1-rA2 I i-jI.
Without loss of generality, we will look at the decision problem of the agent with
index zero and for all the agents we will relabel k= Ij I. This decision problem is
the same for all agents and k can just be thought of as the distance between two
agents in a prospective match. We assume that there are agents dying and new
agents being born so that the distribution of workers met in the labor market
does not change over time (the actual size of the labor market is irrelevant, only
its distribution matters). The distribution of k's is assumed to be uniform across
12the unit interval (which is equivalent to an assumption that j's are distributed
uniformly across the interval (-1, 1)). Each worker meets another new worker
after an interval 1/N (where again N will indicate the density of the location
with more dense locations having more frequent meetings).
Workers who do not match receive the reservation wage, rW (W is the stock
value of remaining unmatched forever). This reservation wage can be thought of
as the wage in some secondary sector or as unemployment benefits. Since we
will be observing wage growth only among employed workers, we will assume
that unmatched workers are in fact employed. Workers when deciding to make
a match or wait until the next period will decide to match wheit
(13) A1 -A2k￿ 1/NV*
where V represents the expected value of beginning the next period without a
match (on top of the wage in the unmatched sector which we simply subtract
from each side). The equilibrium involves solving for k*, the furthest distance
accepted in equilibrium. At k* (13) holds with equality. Solving for k*, means
solving for the expectation of Vt:
(14) V*= Jk.131/Nv*f(k)dk + I0k(A1..A2k)f(k)dk
Solving equations (13) and (14) for k* yields:
(15) k*=(A2+(A22_2A1A2 (p1/N/(]._31/N)))'/2)/2A1
It is true that k/N<O so the minimum accepted match falls with thespeed of
new meetings, or with our interpretation, urban density. Likewise it iseasy to
show that the expected wage in the city (as a function of time) is theprobability
of having a job as of time t times the expectedwage conditional upon getting a
job (which we will call r(AiA2k*/2), where r is the per period rate of interesting
to convert the stock of life earnings into a flow):
(16) Expected Wage at Time t= rWf(1_(1k)t/N) r(AiA2k*/2).
13Here it is easy to show that the cross derivative between time and N is positive
meaning that while expected earnings at time zero are equal in the city and the
suburb expected earnings as of time t are the same.
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium of this model. Line A represents A1-A2k Curves
B and C show f31/NV(K), the benefit from waiting for a match with the minimum
acceptable cutoff being K. Curve B shows the benefit of waiting in the city (when
N2). Curve C shows the benefit of waiting when N=1. The benefit of waiting is
uniformly higher in the city than in the hinterland, so the urban residents will
always require a higher match to settle. Figure 4 illustrates the path of earnings
in the city and the suburbs. The rural resident has higher wages than his urban
counterpart early in life, because the rural resident is less picky and accepts a
match quicker. The urban resident has higher expected wages later in life and
higher expected lifetime earnings. This model presents an alternative
explanation for faster wage growth in cities, but in this case faster wage growth
should disappear when we control for characteristics of job match.
III. Data Description
The primary data source used in this paper is the version of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) used by Topel (1990). It is described more fully in
Appendix A of Topel (1990). Roughly, the basic sample includes male heads of
households from the first 16 waves of the PSID. Agricultural workers, the self-
employed and workers who are part of the PSIDts poverty sample were
excluded. Our second sample came from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY), where we again restricted our attention to males. In this case we
used only one year of wage evidence (1989).
We have split the PSID sample up into three groups: SMSA and City, SMSA non-
city and non-SMSA. SMSA and City refers those workers in the PSID who lived
in both a SMSA and a city with more than .5 million inhabitants. SMSA non-city
refers to those workers who lived in a SMSA outside of a city of .5 million
inhabitants. Non-SMSA refers to those workers who lived outside a SMSA. For
all geographical categories we only have information on where the worker lived,
not where he worked. For the NLSY we have split workers up only into those
we live in an SMSA and those who do not live in an SMSA.
14Tables 1 and 2 --Meansand Correlations
Table 1 gives the means and standard deviations for the variables in our
regressions. We have 43,657 person-year observations in the PSID. Of these
12,421 observations are SMSA and City observations. 15,581 are Non-city SMSA
observation and 15,655 are Non-SMSA observations. The wage variable we
chose to use was the log of hourly earnings (described in Topel (1990)). We
thought that this variable came closest to capturing the price of labor paid by
firms (which is the relevant measure of cross-space productivity effects as per
equation (3)). This variable is not deflated by the CPI, but we will use time
dummies in all of our regressions which will eliminate both inflation and
unrelated business cycle effects. The difference in log wages between the cIty
and non-SMSA is .316. The SMSA non-city average wage lies between those
extremes. The next row shows the wages after controlling for year effects and
that the wage differences is not simply the result of omitted inflation controls.
The third variable is potential experience (age minus schooling minus five as in
Topel (1990)). The average individual in our PSID sample has 20 years of
experience but there is little difference in this variable across locations. Schooling
does differ across locations. The average city resident has 12.6 years of schooling.
The average non-city SMSA resident has 12,5 years of schooling and theaverage
non-SMSA resident has 11.6 years of schooling. There is some evidence of slight
selection based on schooling, but this can only be true when comparing non-
SMSA with non-city SMSA residents. There is no difference in average schooling
between city and non-city SMSA residents. The percent non-white is much
higher in urban areas. 39% of the city dwellers are non-white in this sample as
opposed to 25.5% for SMSA non-city dwellers. Job tenure is slightly longer
inside the city.
We have also created an occupational index based on the average occupation in
the individuals one-digit SIC occupation. We find that (as in average education)
there is a difference between SMSA dwellers and non-SMSA dwellers in this
variable, but there is little difference between city and non-city SMSA dwellers in
this occupation variable as well.
15The NLSY means and standard deviations do not allow us to distinguish
between city SMSA and non-City SMSA. We are forced to group all SMSA
dwellers together. In this sample, we have many more SMSA dwellers (2492
observations) than non-SMSA dwellers. We find that the SMSA wage is lower
than the non-SMSA wage when individual characteristics are not controlled for.
We find that city dwellers have slightly more education (which means slightly
less experience). All of our workers are of a very similar age group (since this is
one year of the NLSY) so having more potential experience is closely correlated
with having less education (-70%). There are in fact more non-whites in the
SMSA, NLSY sample (due to the NLSY's sampling procedures). The
occupational indices are almost the same between these groups.
We have an extra variable in the NLSY which will perhaps help us answer the
omitted ability bias question better. We have included the 1981 Armed Forces
Qualification Test as a variable for this sample. This variable shows a higher
"ability" as measured by this variable for the residents of the city. We cannot tells
if this difference is enough to eliminate the urban wage premium until it is
placed in a regression format.
Table 2 shows the sample correlations for this group. We have done the
correlations for the entire sample for both the NLSY and the PSID samples. We
included the table to provide interested readers for more information on the
samples.
IV. Results on Wage Regressions
Our estimation procedure basically involves no more than estimating versions of
basic wage regressions. Under the conditions sketched above, this equation will
yield information on individual productivity and how productivity changes with
urban location. Our basic procedure is to estimate:
(17) Wg =XIj3+C+S+X7*Cg + aj+Lit
whereW is the log of the hourly wage. X is a vector of individual
characteristics and 3 is the price of those characteristics in the non-urban labor
market. C takes on a value of one if an individual lives in a city with more than
16.5 million inhabitants. S takes on a value of one if an individual lives in a
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area but not in a city with more than .5 million
inhabitants. y represents the premium paid for certain individual characteristics
in the urban labor market and a4 captures an individual specific productivity
effect (individual ability).
Our estimation procedure will focus on estimates of C and estimates of y. Our
procedure will be to begin with ordinary least squares without individual fixed
effects. We will then try estimating the equation with individual fixed effects
and with instrumental variables. The goal of those estimations is to eliminate
any urban wage premium that might be reflecting the important of omitted
ability bias (i.e. the correlation between C and a).
Table Three --BasicWage Regressions (PSID)
Table Three presents our basic regression results. Regression (1) shows the urban
wage premium controlling for nothing other than time dummies. This regression
suggests that the raw wage difference (C) between non-city dwellers and urban
residents is 32.34%. Residents of SMSAs who do not live in large cities also
receive a large wage premium of 20.99 %.
Regression(2) includes some predetermined individual characteristics (potential
labor market experience, education and race) We have tried to distinguish these
features (which should not be related to urban labor markets) from
characteristics which are clearly a function of agents' local labor market
conditions. We find that the urban wage premium (and the SMSA non-city
premium) both drop approximately 3% when these variables are included in the
regression. In fact there are two countervailing effects of controlling for
background characteristics. City residents are better educated, but they are also
more non-white. Controlling for education alone would lesson the urban wage
premium more. Controlling for race, raises the urban wage premium. The net
effect is this 3% move in the premium.
This small change in the urban wage premium that comes about from included
observable productivity characteristics makes it questionable whether the
remainder of the urban wage premium can be explained by omitted ability
17factors. These omitted ability factors would have to be (1) much more important
and (2) much more correlated with living in the city than the observable ability
variables that we have included in our sample. We believe that the small change
in the urban wage premium created by controlling for individual characteristics
makes it difficult to believe that the entire urban wage premium is omitted ability
bias.
Regression (3) includes controls for tenure and average occupational education
(job characteristics).It is useful to distinguish between controlling for
background characteristics (that should not be a result of urban residence) and
controlling for job characteristics (that may themselves be a function of
geographical residence). Controlling for these job characteristics drops the urban
wage premium by another 2% to 26.88%.
Regression (4) is our first fixed effects estimation. We are now controlling for an
individual fixed effect (in essence we are including 4646 individual dummies
(which is why the adjusted r-squared is so low). Identification of variables
involves looking at whether individuals who change their status in some way
have an accompanying change in wages. We see that this methodology
essentially eliminates the urban wage premium causing it to fall to 3.24%. One
interpretation of these results is that the urban wage premium is all omitted
ability factors. Another interpretation is that the urban wage premium is not
closely tied (temporally) to moving to a city.. If wages accrue to rural-urban
migrants only over time, these fixed effects regressions would not pick up an
urban wage premium since most movers are followed for only a few years.
Table Four --Interactionsand City and Individual Effects
Table Four allows the urban wage premium to differ according to individual
characteristics. Regression (5) allows there to be interactions between the city
variable and experience and education. We find that the returns to experience
are essentially untouched by place of residence. Contrary to some views of cities
which might predict that being in a city is most valuable for the most educated
(who are able to take advantage of urban productivity enhancers) we find that
cities do not raise the returns to schooling. This evidence goes against the
18version of the omitted ability bias story that claimed that better workers were
attracted to cities because the return to skill is higher in cities.
However, the returns to experience are higher in cities as shown in regression (5)
and Chart 1. The wage gap between inexperienced workers and workers with
between 20 and 25 years of experience is 12.4% higher in cities than in the SMSA
non-city or non-SMSA areas. Chart 1 shows the progression of the urban wage
premium with experience.
Regression (6) includes controls for job level characteristics. These controls are
meant to see if the urban-experience cross effect is simply a result of job quality,
as it would be under the coordination hypothesis. We believe that tenure and
average occupational education may in some sense proxy for job quality.
Controlling for these variables does not eliminate the higher returns to education
in cities at all. We also find that the returns to being in a "better" occupation are
less in cities than in the non-city areas. This means that being outside a city hurts
individuals in low schooling occupations more than high schooling occupations.
Regression (7) includes fixed effects into regression (6). One interpretation for
the positive connection between urban residence and experience is that less able
individuals leave cities over time. So we observe a positive cross -effect between
city residence and experience coming from this selection effect. By controffing
for individual fixed effects we can eliminate tlis effect. We still find in equation
(7)thatthe difference between inexperienced workers and workers with between
20 and 25 years of experience is over 10% more in cities than in the non-city
areas.
Regression (7) also tells us that the urban wage premium for a white, untenured
worker, with less than five years of experience, with 12 years of education and 12
years of education in his occupation is -5%. However, that worker with 20 years
of experience has an urban wage premium of 6.5%. The urbanwage premium is
zero or negative with fixed effects estimates for younger workers. Still it is
positive for older workers.
19Table Five --InstrumentalVariables and the NLSY
Our primary method of dealing with omitted ability bias is to use the experience
of migrants. We will return to this methodology in the following section.
However, instrumental variables also provide a means of identifying the urban
wage premium. If there is a series of variables that are unrelated to individual
ability but that do increase the likelihood that an individual will reside in a city
then we can use these variables to estimate the urban wage premium. This
instrumental variables methodology will also be robust to some of the problems
of fixed effects estimation (such as when wage gains are not immediately tied to
changes in status).
We have switched from the PSID to the NLSY because the NLSY gives us a more
complete individual history and a broader range of taste variables. We will be
comparing the wages of 30 years olds. Regressions (8), (9) and (1.0) in Table Five
shows the basic wage regression or this sample. We are here using only the
SMSA dummy. Regression (8) shows that the basic SMSA premium was 19.37%
for this sample. This premium is not directly comparable to either premium in
Table Three because (1) it indudes both city SMSA workers and non-city SMSA
workers and (2) the NLSY sample is considerably younger and we know that the
urban wage premium rises with age. In regression (9) the SMSAwage premium
falls to 16.76% once the experience, education and race variables are included in
the regression.
Regression (10) includes the AFQT variable from the NLSY. This variable is an
ability test given to the members of this sample and is one possible measure of
omitted ability that is not captured by the standard individual characteristics. In
fact, this variable is higher in SMSAs than in the hinterland so it does make it
possible that part of the urban wage premium is omitted ability bias. Controlling
for AFQT scores causes only a 1.15 % fall in the urban wage premium. As we
argued above, since observable ability factors make only small differences in the
urban wage premium we find it difficult to believe that unobservable ability
factors are driving the ability bias that remains.
Regressions (11) and (12) present our instrumental variables estimates.
Appropriate instruments must be related to the likelihood of living in a city but
20unrelated to omitted individual ability. In equation (17) these instruments must
be correlated with C but not with a. We have focused on (1) individual's place of
birth and (2) taste parameters. Our primary instrument is where an individual
lived (country or town) at age 14. This instrument is the main contributor to our
results and we find that using this instrument we still get a statistically
significant 24% urban wage premium as shown in regression (9). We performed
a Wu-Hausman test and these instruments passed the exogeneity requirements.
We also included a series of instruments that are less likely to be orthogonal to
individual ability: individual taste parameters. The taste parameters we thought
might be related to the decision to live in a city (and indeed they are correlated
with that decision) are (1) religion dummies that reflect the frequency of religious
attendance, (2) attitudes towards traditional role models, (3) age at which first
smoked, and (4) a taste for a more active social life (captured in the age the
worker first had sex). These variables are meant to capture taste parameters and
were all correlated with urban location. They also passed a Wu-Hausman test of
the overidentifying restrictions.
The overall effect (after instrumenting with taste variables and the residence at
age 14) rises to 25.6%. This result, bigger SMSA premiums with instrumental
variables suggest that omitted ability is not driving the urban wage premium.
This evidence does not, though, help us distinguish between cities being awage
level or a wage growth effect.
Table Six-- Migrants
Since the Fixed Effects estimates seemed mildly contradictory to our
instrumental variables estimates we decided to examine them more closely in
Table Six. Regression 13 and 14 include a full set of regressors which are
suppressed for easier viewing. Regression 14 also includes a full set of
individual fixed effects to help eliminate ability biases or selection effects.
Regression 13 shows the OLS results on migrants. Migrants from non-SMSA to
cities earned significantly lower than their expected wages before the migration.
Within the first two years after moving the migrants to the city receive the
expected wages of city workers with their characteristics. These migrants also
21receive the SMSA premium (which is 29% in this regression). By six years after
their time of migration, these migrants seem to receive much higher (29% urban
wage premium plus 29% when comparing pre-mover dummy with post-mover
dummies --anunbelievably high effect).
Regression (14) controls for fixed effects and gets more realistic estimates. Here
we find that the movers receive almost no wage gains during the year that they
move. However, by the next year their wages have risen by between 10 and 14%,
which is far from the urban wage premium but still a significant difference.
Since movers do receive some of their wage gains immediately upon migration,
we must ask why the fixed effects methodology failed to show us any premium.
The answer is that urban-rural migrants also receive large wage gains from
migration and since the wage gains operate in both directions the fixed effects
methods do not pick up a city effect. This wage gains working in both directions
is not surprising since mobility either way requires paying costs sowage gains
must offset those costs.
There is however, one additional fact given to us by the regressions. Wages for
urban-rural migrants had fallen precipitously in the years before migration and
the actual gain from migration only brought these workers back up to parity with
their pre-migration wages. This is not as true for newly urbanized workers. One
interpretation might be that urban-rural workers received wage gains because
they were fleeing bad job market outcomes while rural-urban workers were
receiving the gains from urban productivity effects.
The general results of the migrants evidence is mixed. It does seem that rural-
urban migrants (even controlling for fixed effects) receive a wage increase (on the
order of 10%) when they come to the city. The OLS estimates suggest that
migrants wages rise over time, suggesting the urban wage growth effect. The
fixed effects estimates aren't accurate enough to say anything about dynamics of
wage paths post migration. This evidence is compatible with a level effect on the
order of 10% and is also compatible with an urban wage growth premium.
22V. Conclusion
Thispaperset up three simple,explanations of the urban wage premium: (1) a
level productivity effect (as in Rauch or traditional urban economics), (2) omitted
ability being correlated with urban status (as in Johnson (1953)) or (3) a
learning/coordination effect where urban status effect wage growth not wage
levels. The evidence compiled in this paper tells us that the urban wage
premium is not robust to individual fixed effects in the PSID, but that the urban
wage is robust to instrumental variables estimation in the NLSY.
Looking at migrants suggested that the pure level effects accruing to rural-urban
migrants is approximately 10% (which is no more than the level effect accruing to
urban-rural migrants). A pure omitted ability bias theory is rejected by both the
migrants data and by the instrumental variables estimation. Since (1) the level
effect on migrants is at most 10%, (2) migrants experience fast wage growth post-
migration in the OLS estimates and (3) there is a cross-effect between urban
residence and experience, we believe that the bulk of the urban wage premium
comes from an interaction between urban residence and skill accumulation.
Cities seem to speed wage growth.
We attempted to distinguish between two potential explanation of higher wage
growth in cities: coordination and learning. One explanation is that the rate of
skill acquisition was higher in cities. The other explanation suggested that cities
acted by facilitating better matching. Our evidence is that the higher urban
returns to experience do not disappear once labor market outcomes have been
included in the regression. We therefore believe that the city wage growth effect
works by enhancing skill accumulation not by improving quality of labor market
outcomes.
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FIGURE 1: LEARNING IN CITIES
Skilled
Curve A represents the newly high skilled workers, i.e. the flow into the stock
of skilled workers, as a function of last period's skilled workers in the city.
Curve B represents the newly high skilled workers, i.e. the flow into the stock
of skilled workers, as a function of last period's skilled workers outside the city.
Une C represents the old high skilled workers who perished, i.e. the flow out of
the stock of skilled workers, as a function of last periods skiiled workers.
Equilibria are the intersections of Une C with Curves A and B.
The parameters used to generate this graph are that 10% of the skilled workers
perish each period, 50% of all meetings result in skill transfer and there are two
meetings per period in the city and one meeting per period in the country.





City Wages shows the path of expected wages for an urban worker; country wages
show the path of expected wages for a rural worker. The parameters are the same
as in the above figure. In addition, we have set skilled wages equal to two and










FIGURE 3: COORDINATION IN CITIES
Line A represents the benefit of accepting a job as a function of match distance.
Curve B represents the benefit of waiting for a job as a function of the
maximum job distance which will be accepted in the future for urban workers.
Line C represents the benefit of waiting for a job as a function of the
maximum job distance which will be accepted in the future for rural workers.
Equilibria are the intersections of Line A with Curves B and C.
The parameters used to generate these graphs that the stock value of a job is
2 minus .9 times job match, the unmatched wage is .25, the discount factor is .8
(so the interest rate is 25%). There are two meetings per period in the city and
one meeting per period in the country.







City Wages shows the path of expected wages for an urban worker; country wages
show the path of expected wages for a rural worker. The parameters are the same
as in the above figure. Wages in the matched sector are equal to the interest rate
times the stock value of the match.
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Table Three - Base Regressions (PSID)
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Chart One: Experience component of City Wage Premium L (Equation 5)
Years of Experience
6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 >35